Abstract
Introduction
Monday, 9 December 2013, was a typical chilly mid-winter day in Moscow. Svetlana Mironiuk, the editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti, the second-biggest Russian national news agency, went about her regular business: she met her editors, conducted a short meeting with a minister and went to instruct the newsroom. In the afternoon Mironiuk received a call from the Kremlin.
Sergey Ivanov, Putin's Head of Administration, was calling to tell her that her services were no longer needed. Mironiuk's career was over. This all came as a big shock to everyone, not just to Mironiuk, but also to the whole journalistic community. In many respects, it looked like one of those hostile takeovers of the media outlet which had become typical of Putin's Russia. 4 One aspect, however, was unusual. It was a takeover of a state enterprise orchestrated by state officials against someone with excellent backing from within the Kremlin. in support of the opposition. Others, in turn, were generously rewarded for their loyalty. They could usually fully count on Mironiuk's support and were given free rein to carry out their work autonomously in their own manner. Mironiuk always made sure that they were safe from any pressure or interference from the Presidential Administration.
From nomenklatura to nomenklaturnost'
Mironiuk was just one example of how very distinct managerial practices bear nomenklatura features in today's Russia. This article explores the management style of other leading Russian media managers as an important pillar of Russia's system of governance by examining the career paths of leading Russian media managers from Soviet to post-Soviet times.
We ask to what extent management practices, inherited from the Soviet period, have been preserved in today's Russian media.
Alena Ledeneva calls Putin's system of governance sistema, defined as a set of informal practices and rules familiar to every member of the ruling elite. 7 Her analysis of sistema provides the grounds for our close-up analysis of Russian media managers. In contrast to sistema, which analyses the system of governance as a whole, we switch our lenses away from Drawing on Mark Granovetter's approach to the cultural embeddedness of management styles, we will trace how the institutional settings of media outlets in Russia are affected by the behavioural strategies employed by their owners/managers and social relations between them, the authorities and their staff. Similar questions have been asked in management studies and organizational sociology; how structures survive and hinder progress and whether newcomers, such as foreigners or representatives of the younger generation, can make a difference in ethics, management styles and output. 8 These scholars' focus is, understandably, primarily on industry and finance, rather than media organizations.
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With this research, we attempt to demonstrate that nomenklaturnost' -denoting features reminiscent of the nomenklatura -is an important element of media management practice in and directing force of the Soviet society', no single line in the legislation recognized the existence of the nomenklatura system, and yet it was universal covering the whole Sistema. It was omnipresent and uniform in all types of organizations.
The nomenklatura was based on the close bonds between patrons and their loyal cadres (control), a combination of traditional 'patron-client' relationship where the added element was the Communist Party, which wielded control over both patrons and clients. In order to enter the nomenklatura and make career, junior cadres had to seek out patrons in senior positions who ensured them a future within the state bureaucracy. Loyal cadres themselves accumulated their own pool of loyal cadres to increase their personal status, influence and material benefits (corruption). 10 As the Soviet system had not relied on private economic capital as a source of wealth and power, it used access to certain levels of goods and services as a substitute. This could be access to special food stores or to the 4 th Chief Directorate of Ministry of Health, which provided top medical services to the Party elite. Those who did not abide by the rules of the nomenklatura were subject to collective punishment (coercion). A rebellious nomenklatura member lost any career prospects or chances for professional development. The higher a member of the nomenklatura rose, the more he/she had to lose. This meant that the accumulation 7 of nomenklatura members' resources also made them vulnerable to coercion and kept them under control of senior cadres.
Having inherited some features of Soviet system, nomenklaturnost' today serves a similar goal; personnel control and loyalty assurance. Nomenklaturnost', however, differs from the original nomenklatura in many ways. First, it does not exist as a uniform sistema-wide, omnipresent principle. Rather, it is a 'feature' of particular organizations. Second, nomenklaturnost' is much more a 'moneyed' practice. This is because modern Russia is, in contrast to the Soviet Union, not a scarcity-based society. Those benefiting from nomenklaturnost'
do not receive status-related treats as a status gratification, such as access to special shops.
Nomenklaturnost' relies on various forms of, often illegal or semi-legal, profit sharing between patron and client, e.g. state budget contracts or Kremlin contacts. Not least, nomenklaturnost'
features some mafia-like elements, such as an oath to keep relationship under wraps. The case studies below will demonstrate these modifications.
Nomenklatura research
The nomenklatura has been studied both in Soviet and post-Soviet times as a crucial element of the Soviet political machinery to recruit new cadres and exercise control over the Party , for a popular-academic application of the term. In our analysis, we will borrow three terms from
Voslenskii which encapsulate the functioning of the Soviet system of governance: coercion, control and corruption.
In the late Soviet period the nomenklatura was vividly discussed by Sovietology, which, due to the lack of the first-hand data and reliable information, interpreted the changes in Soviet politics by analyzing the changes in its leadership. 14 The opening of the archives in the 1980s gave scholars, both in Russia and the West, access to previously confidential documents who subsequently produced detailed accounts of the phenomenon. In the first years of post-Soviet As for media, a number of studies provide a vibrant account of the Soviet media landscape and the corpus of research on the perestroika and post-1991 developments is especially rich.
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The state of the research on nomenklatura practices in the Soviet and post-Soviet media, and research on media management in general, is, however, very limited. This study aims to fill this gap.
Research questions and data
We trace today's nomenklaturnost' by dissecting the managerial practices of three leading media managers. We look at them through the prism of their professional biographies. Biography here serves as a framework within which one can see the set of practices characteristic of a media manager and how they have evolved over time. These sets of practices will be interrogated through the three nomenklatura principles established when it was being re-established in the post-Soviet period.
In addition, we conducted interviews with four former security service officers to understand the underlying relations between nomenklatura members in the KGB and the Soviet and post-Soviet mass media. One of them was a KGB general responsible for ideological issues.
Another KGB officer worked as a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990
onwards. One was a diplomat who also occupied a high-ranking position in a research institution and, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, became a senior official at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs. The fourth person was part of the operational staff gathering insider information about employees in media outlets. We conducted three further interviews with political technologists.
We selected the three media managers for their very different backgrounds and the varying career paths they represent. Gusev was born into a nomenklatura family and, thus, imbued with their principles from infancy. He was already high-up in the nomenklatura hierarchy in pre-perestroika times. Sungorkin (born 1954) was not from a privileged family background. He slowly climbed up the ladder and adopted nomenklatura principles to get access and sucess, which he eventually achieved during Gorbachev's perestroika. Dobrodeev was never listed as Soviet nomenklatura member. Depending on their rank, nomenklatura members in the media exercised, and were exposed to, coercion in the form of direct pressure, blackmailing and the fear of job loss. Loyalty was strengthened via special rewards, such as promotion and access to privileges, which opened the gates to various forms of corruption, but the members' close personal networks was the biggest guarantee. If someone stopped playing along, they lost everything with the consequence that all their loyal cadres lost their positions as well.
Being the Party's main newspaper, Pravda enjoyed special status. Its editors-in-chief were appointed by the Politburo. 24 This level of importance and attention was otherwise only attributed to the Chairman of the Television and Radio Committee (Gosteleradio SSSR). Most department editors and some top reporters at Pravda were senior nomenklatura members. 25 As were the editors-in-chief at Izvestiia, the newspaper of the Soviet Union's Supreme Council, their deputies and executive editors. Izvestiia's editor-in-chief was usually also a member of the Party's Central Committee. 26 In television and radio, nomenklatura participation was less pervasive and much less systematic than in the print press, although the most important positions there were also ranked as nomenklatura. Some major political commentators on Soviet television concurrently held positions at the Central Committee.
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The policies of glasnost and the demands for freedom of speech under Gorbachev emerged in part because of opposition to the privileges of the nomenklatura and the inequalities these privileges created. From 1985 onwards, ideological pressure began to ease noticeably.
Some key appointments Gorbachev made triggered radical changes. Alexander Yakovlev, who was exiled as ambassador to Canada in 1973, returned to the Soviet Union in 1985 and was appointed as the head of the Party's department of propaganda. These events caused some major rotation and reshuffling of cadres. Yakovlev got rid of a whole generation of Brezhnevites.
The liberally-minded cadres he appointed were instrumental in the process of democratization in late Soviet society. Journalists now suddenly had the freedom to express their thoughts, to design new programmes and even to set up new media outlets. Now it became possible rise to influential positions based on talent rather than being closely linked with the nomenklatura.
Post-Soviet developments
26 Izvestiia board members could use the Party hospital, which was frequented by the Soviet top elite. When the economic crisis of 1992 set in, major figures in the media nomenklatura -some of whom will be described below -appealed to Yeltsin for financial support. Yeltsin was happy to grant them large subsidies, as this provided him with an opportunity to force them into loyalty and conformity. 30 Yeltsin's strategy worked. As soon as the Kremlin was powerful enough, it returned to a nomenklatura style of media management, including direct command and control. journalists comply with the overall political framing. We suggest that such strong compliance could only be reached with the re-instalment of the nomenklatura model, which was familiar to both media managers and their staff and has since provided efficient obedience.
The following part of the article will explore in detail how nomenklatura practices have resurfaced in the careers of the three major media managers of the post-Soviet period. Gusev also proved capable in financial matters. The privatization of the newspaper in 1992 gave him the chance to build his own media empire: as of today, Moskovskii Komsomolets publishes 15 titles in Russia and 12 abroad. Even with a decline in copy sales, it remains the city's largest paper (up to 700,000 copies daily) and second largest nationally. This expansion has provided Gusev with the opportunity to reward his most loyal cadres generously. For example, and in a similar fashion to RIA Novosti, Gusev appointed some of them to head newly created sub-contractors, which allowed them to enrich themselves.
The case of Gusev proves that a late-Soviet nomenklatura cadre is perfectly capable of turning into a successful capitalist and private owner of large media assets. Gusev used the methods of the nomenklatura -control, coercion and corruption -to run a complex business, which is fairly safe from the attacks of competitors or the Kremlin. Gusev has raised generations of highly professional cadres. The organizational autonomy of his media outlet and his apparent autonomy from the Kremlin have enabled him maintain respect from his former cadres, many of 20 whom have moved on to powerful positions. 39 This in turn has helped him sustain an independent media outlet.
Case II: Vladimir Sungorkin (Komsomol'skaia Pravda) Nenashev was downgraded to a position with little importance. As Sungorkin was associated to Nenashev, he had to leave Sovetskaia Rossiia.
Sungorkin was transferred back to Komsomol'skaia Pravda and, surprisingly, appointed department editor and editorial board member. Departmental editors enjoyed benefits equal to those usually provided only to nomenklatura members. Thus, Sungorkin, whose career prospects had briefly looked grim after his former patron was cast out, now became a listed member of the Komsomol nomenklatura.
With onset of Glasnost many heads also started rolling at Komsomol'skaia Pravda which opened a corridor of further opportunities for Sungorkin. In 1990 he was promoted to deputy editor-in-chief. The same year, everything was collapsing, including the Komsomol. 
Case III: Oleg Dobrodeev (VGTRK)
Unlike Sungorkin and Gusev, Oleg Dobrodeev was not a nomenklatura member; neither was he born into a nomenklatura family nor did he find a patron in the Soviet nomenklatura. Only The case of Oleg Dobrodeev is curious in as much as he was never a nomenklatura member in the Soviet Union and not even close to it, but has meticulously reproduced nomenklatura principles in the 2010s. Dobrodeev has exercised all required components of a nomenklatura management model (command, control, corruption) and, like the Communist Party in Soviet times, he runs a media outlet which is part of the state's propaganda machine.
Conclusion
In accordance with Granovetter's theory of cultural-historical embeddedness of market mechanisms, we can see how patterns of social relations within large media organizations are 
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being perpetuated along the way to a market economy in Russia. Although the nomenklatura as a system of privileged positions disappeared with the break-up of the Soviet Union, certain managerial practices typical for the Soviet nomenklatura have been adopted by the members of Putin's media elite. We use the term nomenklaturnost' to encapsulates the major nomenklatura practices visible today.
The three cases discussed in the article indicate how the principles of nomenklaturnost'
can be successfully applied in Putin's Russia. Having been familiar with the Soviet nomenklatura from the very beginning of their careers, Gusev and Sungorkin learnt the basic nomenklatura skills from scratch and modified them throughout the years, adapting them to the changing times.
More interestingly, however, nomenklatura practices have persistently been re-employed no less by media managers who belong to the younger generations, have never been part of the Soviet nomenklatura and run highly technological and modern organizations. The case of Dobrodeev (and to a lesser extent Mironiuk) shows that someone who was never familiar with the Soviet nomenklatura might nevertheless embrace very similar practices in his management and networking style.
All three of them can look back to a long-term rule (from 16 to 32 years). For all three of them personal loyalty to their respective patrons throughout the years has been the key foundation for their success. Equally important for them has been to create personal bonds with loyal cadres inside their companies. All three media managers have pursued a strategy of spreading their loyal cadres into competing media outlets and political structures with the aim of protecting themselves and increasing their influence in the Russian media system.
Once Gusev became the head of his newspaper, he chose to remain independent.
Throughout his career he has positioned his loyal cadres in powerful positions outside the media so that they form a safety net, which helped him protect his company and sustain his weight as someone the authorities ought to see as an equal. This gives him a leeway to criticize the authorities, but may bring him into conflict with members of Putin's elite. Sungorkin, in contrast, turned his newspaper into a resource loyal to the Kremlin and always at its disposal. His journalists and editors can quickly change their political views in agreement with the state line. This approach has secured Sungorkin a lucrative business and a place in the highest echelons of power. As for his loyal cadres, he has used them to expand within the media market and to receive insight into competitor media outlets.
In the Soviet Union the violation of ideological principles promoted by the Communist Party could ruin a bureaucrat's career and, thus, ideology, played a crucial role in disciplining and controlling people. In post-Soviet Russia, ideological ideas have been widely absent. Instead, the major tools of control are informal and corrupt practices. The state allocates money to the major media outlets, thus enforcing the media managers' loyalty. In turn, media managers control the loyal cadres through financial perks. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Sungorkin and Gusev quickly turned their assets into private property. For Dobrodeev, the issue of financial success has become the driver to oust Mironiuk and gain control over RIA Novosti.
Unlike in Soviet times where privileges have played an important role but money was secondary, in today's Russia the importance of financial incentives to ensure the loyalty and compliance of one's cadres is hard to underestimate. Financial benefits are rewarded directly and indirectly. This is often done through seemingly independent production companies and subcontractors, personally affiliated with key cadres in the head company, who benefit from lucrative contracts. As long as the actions of loyal cadres do not contradict the current Kremlin line and the patron's personal interests, cadres are free to do what they want.
Tracing the origins and perpetuation of nomenklaturnost' can contribute to a better understanding of why professional and ethical values in the media world have deteriorated very
